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Export Credits: The Legal Effect of International 
and Domestic Efforts to Control Their Use 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Export credits are loans offered by an exporter, or by a private or public 
lending institution in the exporting country, to foreign purchasers of goods 
from the exporting country.! This Comment deals with those export credits that 
are granted by governments or that are granted by private banks at interest rates 
subsidized by the government. 
In the post-war era, governments began to offer export credits as a way to 
promote their exports of capital goods.2 Over the past decade these promotion 
efforts have intensified into an export credit war with nations offering export 
credits at rates well below commercial market rates in an effort to undersell 
competing nations and boost their exports.3 The use of subsidized export credits 
runs counter to two policy considerations. First, subsidized export credits are 
expensive, costing industrialized countries more than $5.5 billion in 1980.4 
Second, they are contrary to the principle of free trade, for they give an unfair 
advantage to the industry that benefits from the subsidy: which can distort trade 
and reduce world economic efficiency.6 
Countries wishing to control the use of subsidies, including export credit 
subsidies, have two options.7 A country that is importing a subsidized product 
I. See Mullen, Export Promotion: Legal and Structural Limitations on a Broad United States Commitment, 7 
LAW & POL'y INT'L Bus. 57, 84 (1975). There are two types of export credits. Supplier's credits are 
gr.nted by lending institutions to exporters who then relend to their customers. Id. at 85. Buyer's 
credits are loans made directly to export purchasers. See id.; Streng, Government Supported Export Credit: 
United States Competitiveness, 10 INT'L LAW. 401, 408 (1976). 
2. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE EXPORT CREDIT FINANCING 
SYSTEMS IN OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES 8 (1982)[hereinafter cited as OECD]. Capital goods include such 
products as aircraft, railroad equipment, trucks, buses, automobiles, electrical machinery, machines for 
use in construction, mining, steel and rolling mills, oil fields and offices, and parts for all of the above. L. 
NEHRT, FINANCING CAPITAL EQUIPMENT EXPORTS 3 (1966). 
3. H.R. REp. No. 188, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1981) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REpORT]; Gentlemen 
prefer disagreements, THE ECONOMIST, july 3, 1982, at 59. 
4. A. Wallen, Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits, Implications for 
the Arrangement of Operational Alternatives to the Present Matrix, Annex II, at 1-2, OECD Doc. 
TD/Consensus/80.9 [hereinafter cited as Wallen Report], reprinted in Competitive Export Financing: 
Hearing before the Subcomm. on International Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 54-55 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Hearing]. 
5. See J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 755 (1977). 
6. Barcelo, Subsidies and Countervailing Duties - Analysis and a Proposal, 9 LAw & POL'y INT'L Bus. 
779,798 (1977). 
7. See generally J. JACKSON, supra note 5, at 754-832. 
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can negate the unfair advantage caused by the subsidy by imposing a countervail-
ing duty.s The usefulness of countervailing duties in controlling the use of 
subsidies is limited, however.9 The trade distortions effected by subsidies are 
often felt in international markets, where the subsidized exports of one country 
displace the exports of another. lO An injured exporter cannot use countervailing 
duties to protect itself since countervailing duties have only a domestic effectP 
The second option for controlling subsidies is through international agree-
ments to limit their use.12 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)13 has included rules governing the use of subsidies since its inception in 
1947.14 The GATT signatories agreed to expand the GATT subsidy rules in 
1955.15 A subgroup of GATT signatories agreed to a stricter application of the 
GA TT subsidy rules in 1979 when they signed the Agreement on Interpretation 
and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on 
Tariff's and Trade (Subsidies Code).16 The Subsidies Code prohibits the use of 
export subsidies,17 including subsidized export credits.1s The Subsidies Code 
provides an exception from this general prohibition,19 however, for those gov-
ernment supported export credits that are granted within the terms of the 
Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits (Arrange-
ment).20 
8. [d. at 755. The effect of a countervailing duty may be seen in the following illustration. Suppose 
that country A subsidizes the manufacture of widgets by paying one dollar to manufacturers for each 
widget produced. If some widgets are exported to country B, they will have an unfair advantage over 
country B's domestically produced widgets that are produced without any government subsidy. Coun-
try B can eliminate this unfair advantage by imposing a countervailing duty of one dollar, equal to the 
amount of subsidy, on each imported widget. See id. at 754-55. 
9. Note, Export Credits: An [nternatwnal and Domestic Legal Analysis, 13 LAw & POL'y INT'L Bus. 1069, 
1082 (1981). 
10. See Barcelo, supra note 6, at 797-98. 
II. Moore, Export Credit Arrangements, in EMERGING STANDARDS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND IN-
VESTMENT 164-65 (S. Rubin & G. Hufbauer eds. 1984). 
12. See J. JACKSON, supra note 5, at 754-80. 
13. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done Oct. 30,1947,61 STAT. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,55 
V.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter cited as GATT]. 
14. [d. art. XVI. See J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 367-71 (1969), for a 
discussion of how the GATT subsidy rules were negotiated. 
15. Protocol Amending the Preamble and Parts II and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, done March 10, 1955,8 V.S.T. 1767, T.I.A.S. No. 3930, 278 V.N.T.S. 168 [hereinafter cited as 
Protocol]. 
16. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI ahd XXIII of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done April 12, 1979,31 V.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619 [hereinafter 
cited as Subsidies Code], reprinted in MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE 
TOKYO ROUND OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
pt. I, 257-307 (1979). 
17. [d. art. IX. 
18. [d. Annex A, item k. 
19. [d. 
20. Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits, OECD Doc. TDI 
Consensusl78.4 (1st revision) (Feb. 22, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Arrangement]. 
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The Group on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)2I drafted the Arrangement 
in February 1978.22 The Arrangement sets minimum interest rates and maxi-
mum terms for government supported export credits in an effort to control the 
expense of subsidized export credits.23 The Arrangement has substantially re-
duced export credit subsidies, but it has not eliminated them.24 In recent years a 
number of products imported into the United States have benefitted from 
subsidized export credits.2s In response, American manufacturers have filed 
countervailing duty petitions against these subsidized imports with the Interna-
tional Trade Administration (ITA).26 Two of these petitions have led to 
precedent-setting decisions by the IT A which established that countervailing 
duties can be imposed against subsidized export credits under U.S. law.27 
In the Ceramic Tile From Mexico case, the ITA found that the government of 
Mexico had aided its exporters of ceramic tile by making available to them funds 
at below market interest rates which they could relend to their foreign pur-
chasers.28 In the Railcars From Canada case, the ITA ruled that Bombardier, a 
Canadian producer of railcars, had benefitted from Canadian government ex-
port credit subsidies worth $90,882,000 in its contract to sell 825 subway cars to 
the New York Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA).29 
These cases were decided against the backdrop of a dispute between the 
United States and the European Community concerning the use of countervail-
ing duties against export credits. The European Community argues that because 
21. Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, done Dec. 14, 
1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728, T.I.A.S. No. 4891. 
22. Arrangement, supra note 20. 
23. See id. para. 3. 
24. S~~ NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL POLICIES, AN-
NUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1981, at 49 [hereinafter cited as 
NAC REpORT]; see al.so note 207 and accompanying text. 
25. Countervailing duty petitions alleging the use of subsidized export credit have been filed against 
the following United States imports: Ceramic Tile from Mexico, 47 Fed. Reg. 7866 (1982); Certain 
Commuter Airplanes From France and Italy, 47 Fed. Reg. 25,077 (1982); Railcars From Canada, 47 
Fed. Reg. 31,415 (1982); Certain Commuter Airplanes From Brazil, 47 Fed. Reg. 37,309 (1982); 
Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation, Large Diameter Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes 
From France, 47 Fed. Reg. 24,169 (l982). 
26. S~e supra note 25 and investigations cited therein. The International Trade Administration (IT A) 
is a primary operating unit within the Commerce Department. The Secretary of Commerce created the 
ITA on January 2, 1980. Department Organization Order No. 10-3,45 Fed. Reg. 6141 (1980). By this 
order, the Secretary delegated to the ITA the authority vested in the Secretary by 19 U.S.C. §§ 
1671-1677f (1982). 
27. S~. Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination; Ceramic Tile From Mexico and 
Countervailing Duty Order, 47 Fed. Reg. 20,012 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Ceramic Tile]; and Final 
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination; Railcars From Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 6569 (1983) 
[hereinafter cited as Railcars Final Determination]. 
28. Ceramic Tile, supra note 27, at 20,014-15. 
29. S~e Railcars Final Determination, supra note 27, at 6571-73. See al.so irifra the text accompanying 
notes 288-94. 
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of the exception made in the Subsidies Code for the Arrangement, export 
credits that comply with the Arrangement are not countervailable under the 
countervailing duty rules of the Subsidies Code.30 United States trade 
negotiators, however, argue that the Subsidies Code does allow the countervail-
ing of any subsidized export credit.31 This issue was raised in both the Ceramic 
Tile From Mexico and the Railcars From Canada cases, but no official U.S. position 
has been taken on the issue as the IT A refused to consider it.32 
This Comment explores whether the Subsidies Code permits the use of coun-
tervailing duties against subsidized export credits that are in compliance with the 
Arrangement. Initially, this Comment explains how and why subsidized export 
credits are granted and why their use should be reduced or eliminated. The 
author then discusses the efforts to control subsidies in general under GATT 
and the Subsidies Code and the efforts to control subsidized export credits in 
particular by the OECD. After analyzing the arguments advanced by the United 
States and the European Community in their dispute over the use of countervail-
ing duties against subsidized export credits, this Comment concludes that the 
United States' interpretation of the Subsidies Code should prevail, given the 
policy objectives that were the motivation for the Code. 
II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
A. The Use of Government Supported Export Credits 
The granting of government supported export credits had its origins in the 
post-war era.33 At that time the reconstruction of Europe and Japan and the 
implementation of development programs in the newly independent countries 
had created a large demand for capital goods.34 While developing countries had 
historically borrowed from private banks in order to finance their purchases of 
capital goods, this source of credit had largely disappeared due to the risk of 
default in the financial chaos of the 1930s.35 As a result, the burden fell on 
manufacturers to provide credit in their sales to developing countries.36 The 
30. Brief of the European Communities, Certain Commuter Airplanes From France and Italy, 47 
Fed. Reg. 37,309 (1982). [hereinafter cited as Brief of the European Communities] (This case was 
terminated before any determination of the matter of subsidy, and the parties have retained control of 
their case files). 
31. Telephone interview with John Greenwald (Dec. 6, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Greenwald 
interview]. Mr. Greenwald served in the Carter Administration as Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Commerce for Import Administration and as Deputy General Counsel, Office of the Special Represen-
tative for Trade Negotiations, Executive Office of the President. In the latter capacity, Mr. Greenwald 
took part in the negotiation of the Subsidies Code. 
32. Ceramic Tile, supra note 27, at 20,014; Railcars Final Determination, supra note 27, at 6578-9. 
33. UNITED NATIONS, EXPORT CREDITS AND DEVELOPMENT FINANCING 5 (1967). 
34. !d. 
35. [d. 
36. L. NEHRT, supra note 2, at 2. 
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manufacturers and their commercial banks, however, were unwilling and unable 
to bear the risk of providing export credits for sales to developing countries.37 
Most industrialized countries then realized the need for government support of 
export credits in order to promote their exports of capital goods.3s 
Governments support export credits in a variety of ways. The Export-Import 
Bank of the United States and the Export-Import Bank of Japan obtain their 
funds at the government bond rate39 and then relend them to exporters or their 
customers.40 Private banks in the Netherlands that offer export credits borrow 
from the Central Bank at the government bond rate.41 In the United Kingdom, 
the Export Credits Guarantee Department sets the interest rates at which private 
banks may offer export credits.42 Any difference between these rates and com-
mercialloan rates is made up by a direct government payment to the banks.43 In 
France and Italy, the Banque Franl;:aise du Commerce Exterieur and the 
Mediocredito Centrale support export credits with funds obtained at the gov-
ernment bond rate and with direct government payments.44 
B. Policy Arguments Against the Use of Government Supported Export Credits 
Despite the widespread use of government supported export credits, two 
policy considerations argue strongly for the limitation of their use. First, they are 
expensive for those countries offering them.45 Second, they are contrary to the 
principle of free trade which forms the basis for GATT.46 
1. Cost Considerations 
With the exception of Switzerland and West Germany, all of the industrialized 
countries offer export credits at rates below commercial rates,47 indicating that a 
37. [d. at 2-3; UNITED NATIONS, supra note 33, at 5. 
38. OECD, supra note 2, at 8. 
39. [d. at 12. The government bond rate is that interest rate a government must pay to borrow on the 
private capital markets. Because government bonds have a low risk, they command an interest rate 
several points lower than that on commercial loans. M. STIGUM, THE MONEY MARKET; MYTH, REALITY, 
AND PRACTICE 25 (1978). Government bonds bear different rates of interest, depending on their term. 
Id. The government bond rate applicable in the export credit field is that on medium term bonds, which 
have terms of three to ten years, depending on the issuing country. See A. Wallen, supra note 4, Annex r, 
at I. By borrowing at the government bond rate, export credit agencies can relend at rates below 
commercial rates while still turning a profit. See Note, supra note 9, at 1070. 
40. OECD, supra note 2, at 12. 
41. Id. at r I. 
42. Id at 229. 
43. /d. at 10. 
44. [d. at 10-11. 
45. See A. Wallen, supra note 4, Annex II, at I. 
46. See GATT, supra note 13, preamble. 
47. See OECD, supra note 2, at 9-12. 
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government subsidy is provided.48 The European governments began to sub-
sidize their export credits in the early 1970s to match the export credit terms of 
the United States Export-Import Bank, which could offer export credits at low 
rates without subsidization due to low interest rates in the United States.49 When 
the oil price shocks of the 1970s caused balance of payments deficits and 
unemployment in the West, subsidized export credits were increasingly used in 
an attempt to increase exports, thereby reducing unemployment and easing the 
balance of payments deficit.50 
A report prepared by Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates demon-
strates the motivation for the use of subsidized export credits.51 This report 
shows that the cost of subsidized export credit can be justified by its effects.52 If 
subsidized export credit makes the difference in winning a contract, the increase 
in economic activity incident to the exports causes a rise in government tax 
receipts that pays for the cost of the subsidy many times over.53 However, 
favorable export credit terms offered by one country are usually matched by 
competing countries, so that the competitive advantage to be gained in making 
the subsidized credit is lost.54 The competition in subsidized export credits has 
become so intense that it cost the industrialized nations as much as $5.5 billion in 
1980.55 American trade officials believe that the cost was even higher in 1981.56 
48. See id. at 9. It is difficult to compare the cost of government-supported export credits given the 
variety of ways in which the export credit programs are run. Suppose, for example, that the United 
Kingdom and the United States both offer export credits at 11%. Assume also that the medium-term 
government bond rate in each country is 10% and commercial credit is available in both countries at 
15%. The United States would officially be making a profit on its'export credits since the Export-Import 
Bank would be borrowing at 10% and lending at 11%. The United Kingdom, however, would be 
making available export credits at 11 % by paying to private banks the 4% difference between commer-
cial interest rates and the export credit rate set by the government. If one holds that a subsidy can exist 
only when there has been a government expenditure, then it would appear that the United Kingdom 
was subsidizing its export credits while the United States was not, even though both countries would be 
offering export credits at the same interest rate. In order to evaluate government export credit 
programs equally, this Comment defines a subsidized export credit as one offered at an interest rate 
below commercial interest rates. Compare Note, supra note 9, at 1070 n.6 with Subsidies Code, supra note 
16, Annex A, item k and with Streng, supra note 1, at 402. 
49. Moore, supra note 10, at 145. 
50. Gentlemen prefer disagreemnus, supra note 3, at 59. As American exporters lost contracts to foreign 
competitors who could finance their exports with export credits at more favorable terms, Congressmen 
spoke for the need to either match these foreign export credits or negotiate their prohibition. See 
Hearing, supra note 4. The gravity of losing export sales was underscored by the Commerce Depart-
ment's estimate that a billion dollars in exports generates 40,000 to 50,000 jobs. HOUSE REPORT, supra 
note 3, at 10. 
51. Budd Company and Westinghouse Electric Corporation: Buenos Aires Subway Car Contract; 
Net Impact on the Government of Export-Import Financing, reprinted in Competitive Export Financing Act 
of 1981: Hearing before the Subcomm. on International Finance and Monetary Policy of 1M Senate Comm. on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Competitive Export 
Financing Act of 1981]. 
52. See id. 
53. 1d. at 71. 
54. See Hearing, supra note 4, at 131, 134 (testimony of Reuben Askew, U.S. Trade Representative). 
55. A. Wallen, supra note 4, Annex II, at 1. 
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The real beneficiaries from the competition in export credit terms are often the 
importing countries, which have occasionally set one country against another in 
an attempt to get better financing terms.57 By offering export credits at below 
market rates, countries are in effect giving aid to the buyer.58 
2. Free Trade Considerations 
The free argument against the use of subsidized export credits can be 
broken down as follows; arguments for fair competition and arguments for 
economic efficiency. The fair competition concerns stem from the belief that all 
subsidies are a form of unfair competition.59 If the exports of a country can be 
bought with government supported export credit at preferential rates, those 
exports will have an unfair advantage over the products of other countries that 
can be bought only with credit at commercial rates.60 The economic efficiency 
argument holds that subsidized export credits should be eliminated because they 
distort trade and reduce world economic well-being.61 In a free market, consum-
ers base their purchasing decisions upon the price and quality of a product.62 
Sellers seek to lower prices and improve quality in order to attract customers, 
thereby increasing economic efficiency and raising the world standard ofliving.63 
Government supported export credits harm free trade by focusing the pur-
chaser's attention on credit terms offered by exporting countries, thereby reduc-
ing the importance of price and quality.64 A purchaser may buy a more expen-
sive or lower quality product because the exporting country offers credit on 
terms more favorable than those available elsewhere.65 
In light of these policy considerations, trading nations have negotiated inter-
national agreements to limit the use of subsidies in international trade. The 
initial 1947 GATT provisions on subsidies, however, were so general as to be of 
56. Competitive EX/JOrtFinancing Act of 1981 ,supra note 51, at 17 (testimony of Robert Cornell, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Trade and Investment Policy). 
57. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 33, at 6. 
58. See Fry, The coming assault on eX/JOrt subsidies, 1980 THE BANKER 71; Plaut, Export-Import Follies, 
FORTUNE, August 25, 1980, at 76. See also Moore, supra note II, at 149. 
59. J. JACKSON, supra note 5, at 755. 
60. See id. 
61. See Barcelo, supra note 6, at 798. 
62. See generally B. STIGUM & M. STIGUM, ECONOMICS I-54 (1968); see also generally P. SAMUELSON, 
ECONOMICS 41-71 (10th ed. 1976). 
63. Stern, Tariffs and Other Measures of Trade Control: A Survey of Recent Developments, II J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 857 (1973), reprinted in J. JACKSON, supra note 5, at 10. See Barcelo, supra note 6, at 798. 
64. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 33, at 5; L. NEHRT, supra note 2, at 2. 
65. See Petition Filed With the United States Trade Representative Under Section 301 of the Trade 
Act of 1974, as Amended, reprinted in Office of the United States Trade Representative [Docket No. 
301-32J, 47 Fed. Reg. 31,764, 31,765. The Railcars From Canado case is a recent example of the market 
distortions export credit subsidies can cause. In the spring of 1982, the New York Metropolitan Transit 
Authority put out to bid specifications for 825 subway cars. Though the Budd Company of Troy, 
Michigan submitted the lowest bid and the earliest delivery date, the contract was awarded to Bombar-
dier of Canada, whose offer included Canadian government export financing at 9.7%. Id. 
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little value.66 More recent efforts to control subsidies by some of the GATT 
nations have led to the Subsidies Code, which prohibits the use of export 
subsidies.67 Simultaneously, the member-nations of the OECD have negotiated 
significant limitations on the use of subsidized export credits.68 
III. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO CONTROL SUBSIDIES 
A. Within the GATT Framework 
As originally drafted in 1947, GATT contained only one paragraph on sub-
sidies, which requires a contracting party to notify in writing all other contracting 
parties to GATT of any subsidy that operates to increase its exports or to reduce 
its imports of a product.69 In cases where a subsidy has seriously prejudiced the 
interests of another contracting party, the subsidizing party must, upon request, 
discuss with the affected party, or with the contracting parties, the possibility of 
limiting the subsidy.70 These notification and consultation requirements have 
been of little value, however, for they have apparently never resulted in the 
limitation of the use of a subsidy.71 
In 1955 the GATT signatories agreed to prohibit those export subsidies on 
non-primary products72 which result in an export price for a product lower than 
the product's domestic price.73 This amendment, which became Paragraph Four 
of Article XVI of GATT, was not put into effect until 1962, however, and has 
been accepted by only seventeen countries.74 Although Paragraph Four provides 
more precise guidelines for the use of subsidies than the original Article XVI 
notification requirements, it has not been very useful in limiting the use of 
subsidies because it prohibits an export subsidy only after a showing of an export 
price lower than the domestic price, a showing which involves the complicated 
task of measuring prices in different currencies.75 The usefulness of Paragraph 
66. See GATT, supra note 13, art. XVI; see also infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. 
67. See Subsidies Code, supr.a note 16; see also infra notes 83-92 and accompanying text. 
68. See Arrangement, supra note 20; see also infra notes 93-201 and accompanying text. 
69. GATT, supra note 13, art. XVI. 
70. [d. GATT does not indicate who is to make the determination of serious prejudice called for in 
Article XVI. The contracting parties to GATT have agreed that an official GATT determination is not 
required, but rather, that any nation may request consultations if it feels seriously prejudiced by the 
subsidy practices of another party. J. JACKSON, supra note 14, at 391. 
71. Rivers & Greenwald, The Negotiation of a Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duty Measures: 
Bridging Fund.amental Policy Differences, 11 LAw & POL'y INT'L. Bus. 1447, 1459-60 (1979). 
72. Protocol, supra note 15, Section It 
73. [d. Section L. 
74. Declaration Giving Effect to the Provisions of Article XVI:4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, Done Nov. 19,1960,13 U.S.T. 2605, T.I.A.S. No. 5227, 445 U.N.T.S. 294 [hereinafter cited 
as 1960 Declaration]. This declaration was accepted by Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, 
West Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Rhodesia, Swe-
den, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND 
TRADE, STATUS OF LEGAL INSTRUMENTS 11-4.2 (Supp. No. 10, April 1982). 
75. Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 71, at 1461. 
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Four has also been hampered by the lack of any definition of the term "export 
subsidy."76 To remedy this deficiency, a 1960 GATT Working Party filed a 
report77 that listed those practices considered subsidies by the signatories to the 
Declaration which gave effect to Article XVI, Paragraph Four.78 One of the 
practices listed was "[t]he grant of governments (or special institutions controlled 
by governments) of export credits at rates below those which they have to pay in 
order to obtain funds so employed."79 Thus, a signatory to the Declaration could 
theoretically use the dispute resolution provisions of GATT to petition for the 
end of the use of subsidized export credits by another signatory to the Declara-
tion. so In practice, however, the GATT dispute resolution provisions have never 
been invoked on this issue.81 A perhaps insurmountable barrier to such a petition 
is the proof of different domestic and export prices, since subsidized export 
credits lower a buyer's cost but do not affect the price.82 
In April 1979, upon completion of negotiations on the Subsidies Code, a 
group of GATT signatories agreed to follow a stricter interpretation of the 
GATT subsidy rules.sa The signatories agreed to seek to avoid causing injury to 
one another through the use of any subsidy.84 The Subsidies Code sharply 
distinguishes between domestic subsidies and export subsidies.85 On the one 
hand, it recognizes domestic subsidies as important instruments of social and 
economic policy and puts no restrictions on their use.86 Export subsidies, on the 
other hand, are prohibited by Article IX, Paragraph One when applied to any 
products other than certain primary products.87 Paragraph Two of Article IX 
76. ld. at 1461-62. 
77. Provisions of Article XVl:4, in GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 
AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 185, 186-7 (9th Supp. 1961) [hereinafter cited as GATT, BASIC IN-
STRUMENTS). 
78. 1960 Declaration, supra note 74. 
79. GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS, supra note 77, at 187. 
80. For an explanation of such a use of the GATT dispute resoilltion provisions, see Note, supra note 
9, at 1078-80. 
81. For those subsidies issues that have been submitted to dispute resolution, see generally GATT, 
Basic lnstru1lU!nts, supra note 77. 
82. See L. NEHRT, supra note 2, at 2; UNITED NATIONS, supra note 33, at 5. 
83. Subsidies Code, supra note 16. The Subsidies Code has been signed by Australia, Austria, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, Egypt, the European Community, Finland, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New 
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, 
Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. GENERAL AGREEMENTS ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, STATUS OF LEGAL INSTRU-
MENTS 16-4.2-4.4 (Supp. No. 10, April 1982). 
84. Subsidies Code, supra note 16, art. VIII, para. 3; art. XI, para. 2. 
85. See id. art. VIII, para I; art. IX, para. I; art. XI, para. 1. 
86. ld. art. VIII, para. I; art. XI, para. 1. 
87. ld. art. IX, para. 1. Certain primary products are defined as any product of farm, forest, or 
fishery in its natural form or which has undergone such processing as is customarily required to prepare 
it for marketing in substantial volume in international trade. ld. art. X n.l; Protocol, supra note 15, 
Section II. 
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refers to the illustrative list of export subsidies in Annex A to the Code.88 Item k 
of the illustrative list deals directly with government supported export credits.89 
It provides that 
The grant by governments (or special institutions controlled by 
and/or acting under the authority of governments) of export credits 
at rates below those which they actually have to pay for the funds so 
employed (or would have to pay if they borrowed on international 
capital markets in order to obtain funds of the same maturity and 
denominated in the same currency as the export credit), or the 
payment by them of all or part of the costs incurred by exporters of 
financial institutions in obtaining credits, in so far as they are used to 
secure a material advantage in the field of export credit terms. 
Provided, however, that if a signatory is a party to an international 
undertaking on official export credits to which at least twelve origi-
nal signatories to this agreement are parties as of 1 January 1979 (or 
a successor undertaking which has been adopted by those original 
signatories), or if in practice a signatory applies the interest rates 
provisions of the relevant undertaking, an export credit practice 
which is in conformity with those provisions shall not be considered 
an export subsidy prohibited by this agreement.90 
The first paragraph of item k makes clear that export credits offered at rates 
below government bond rates are a prohibited subsidy.91 The second paragraph 
of item k then creates an exception for export credits granted in conformity with 
an "undertaking on official export credits."92 Such an undertaking, the Ar-
rangement, was completed by the member nations of the OECD on February 22, 
1978, and became effective on April 1, 1978.93 
B. Through the Framework of the DEeD 
1. Historical Background to the Arrangement 
The Arrangement was the culmination of fifteen years of negotiations and 
discussions by the Group on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees of the 
OECD.94 The Group was established in 1963 as a forum for discussion and 
information exchange in order to reduce export credit competition.95 The first 
88. Subsidies Code, supra note 16, art. IX, para. 2. 
89. See id. Annex A, item k. 
90. Id. 
91. See id. Annex A. item k. 
92. Id. Annex A. item k. 
93. Arrangement, supra note 20. 
94. See Moore, supra note II, at 144·47. 
95. Id. at 144. The Group is composed of senior government officials who have a policy making 
responsibility in the export credits field. These officals are advised by the heads of the export credit 
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products of the Group were "sector agreements" that governed the offer of 
export credit in the sale of ships and ground satellite communications stations.96 
These agreements specified maximum repayment terms, minimum interest 
rates, and minimum down payments when export credits are offered in these 
sectors.97 In 1972, the GECD member countries agreed to exchange information 
whenever any country granted export credits with terms longer than five years. 98 
At the 1974 meeting of the International Monetary Fund, France, Italy, Japan, 
the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany agreed that export 
credits to developing countries should have a maximum term of three years and 
a minimum interest rate of 7.5%.99 It was not decided how these limitations 
would be implemented, however, leaving the parties with nothing more than "an 
agreement to agree."IOO 
Negotiations to reach a final agreement on this 1974 understanding con-
tinued, but progress was impeded by a dispute within the European Community 
as to whether the European Commission or each individual member country had 
jurisdiction to negotiate export credit agreements.101 To circumvent this dispute, 
the participants at the November 1975 Rambouillet Economic Summitl02 laid 
down principles for a "consensus," rather than an "agreement," on export 
credits.103 Countries became "parties" to the Consensus by unilaterally declaring 
their intention to adhere to the Consensus principles. lo4 By 1977, twenty coun-
tries had made such a unilateral declaration. lo5 
Under the Consensus principles export credits could have a maximum term of 
8.5 years when offered to relatively rich and intermediate countries, and ten 
years when offered to relatively poor countries. 106 Credits with terms from two to 
five years were to have a minimum interest rate of 7.5% when offered to 
relatively rich countries and 7.25% when offered to intermediate and relatively 
poor countries. 107 For credits over five years the minimum rates were 8% for 
agencies of their respective countries. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 33, at 29. All of the DECO countries 
participate in the Group with the exceptions of Iceland and Turkey. See OECD, supra note 2, at 7-8. 
96. HOUSE REpORT, supra note 3, at 3. 
97. [d. at 3; Moore, supra note II, at 144-45. 
98. HOUSE REpORT, supra note 3, at 3; Moore, supra note II, at 144. 
99. N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1974, at 60, col. I. 
100. Journal of Commerce, Nov. IS, 1974, at I. 
101. HOUSE REpORT, supra note 3, at 3; Moore, supra note II, at 146. 
102. The Summit participants were Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United 
States, and West Germany. N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1975, at 3, col. 3. 
103. HOUSE REpORT, supra note 3, at 3-4; see Moore, supra note II, at 146. 
104. House Report, supra note 3, at 3-4; see Moore, supra note II, 146. 
105. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 4. In March 1977, the European Court of Justice ruled that the 
European Commission had jurisdiction over export credit negotiations. The Commission endorsed the 
Consensus on March 14, 1977. HOUSE REpORT, supra note 3, at 4. 
106. HOUSE REpORT, supra note 3, at 4; Moore, supra note II, at 146. 
107. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 4. 
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relatively rich countries and 7.5% for intermediate and relatively poor coun-
tries. IOB The Consensus also required a 15% down payment to be made on export 
credits.109 Credits offered for the purchase of aircraft, power plants, agricultural 
commodities, and steel mills were partially or wholly exempted from the terms of 
the Arrangement. l1o 
The negotiations within the Group on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees 
have been instrumental in reducing the differences in the disparate export credit 
operations of the OECD members.1l1 As participants have exchanged informa-
tion on credit offers and discussed particular issues, they have generally con-
formed their export credit programs to those of the majority.1l2 This tendency to 
conform has paved the way for tentative partial understandings between the 
participants, which in turn has made possible negotiations on detailed under-
standings based on a particular practice which has become customary.113 The 
Arrangement is a product of this process of gradual progress to agreement in 
that many provisions in the Arrangement were carried over from the Consen-
SUS,u4 
2. The Arrangement: Provisions and Effect 
The Arrangement retained the Consensus limitations on miniumum interest 
rates and maximum credit terms and continued the Consensus requirement of a 
15% down payment.115 Like the Consensus, the Arrangement partially or wholly 
exempted from its provisions credits offered for the purchase of several types of 
exports, including power plants, ground satellite communication stations, ships, 
aircraft, military equipment, and agricultural commodities.ns The Arrangement 
108. [d. at 4. The Consensus contained the following matrix of minimum interest rates and maxi-
mum terms: 
Classification of Country 
Relatively rich 
Intermediate 
Relatively poor 
HOUSE REpORT, supra note 3, at 4. 
109. !d. 
110. [d. 
Ill. See Moore, supra note II, at 146. 
112. [d. 
113. !d. at 146-47 
114. [d. at 154. 
115. Arrangement, supra note 20, para. I. 
116. !d. paras. 4 and 10. 
Minimum interest Rate 
for Credits of 
2 to 5 
Years 
7.5% 
7.25% 
7.25% 
over 5 
Years 
8% 
7.5% 
7.5% 
Maximum 
Years 
8.5 
8.5 
10 
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was an improvement over the Consensus because it was a longer, more detailed 
document, and because it was uniformly adopted by the OECD nations,117 
whereas the unilateral declarations that had put the Consensus into effect had 
varied slightly from one another, making interpretation and dispute resolution 
difficult. us 
The Arrangement has no legal effect in international law.l19 Agreements 
between nations are legally binding only if there exists an intention to create, 
change, or define relationships under international law.12o In drafting the Ar-
rangement, the signatories made clear that it was not a legally binding agree-
ment,l21 but instead was an "informal agreement" which was "in the form of 
guidelines."122 According to international law, the Arrangement is a "gentle-
men's agreement," which is "an understanding which is clearly intended to affect 
the relations of the parties but not to be legally binding."123 The OECD member 
nations drafted the Arrangement in the form of a gentlemen's agreement at the 
insistence of Japan and France.124 The U.S. negotiatorsl25 agreed to the non-
binding format because of their concern that if the Arrangement were made 
legally binding, it would be much more difficult to negotiate changes.126 
Given its non-binding form, the Arrangement has no enforcement provisions. 
Instead, if a participant intends to offer an export credit that derogates from the 
117. Moore, supra note !l, at 146, 154. 
!l8. See id. 
119. See Arrangement, supra note 20, preamble. 
120. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 115(a) (1975). 
121. Moore, supra note 11, at 154. 
122. Arrangement, supra note 20, preamble. 
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 115, com-
ment g (1965). 
124. Telephone interview with Gary C. Hufbauer, (December 3, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Huf-
bauer interview). Mr. Hufbauer was Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in the Carter Adminis-
tration and a negotiator of the Arrangement. 
125. During negotiations at the OECD Group on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees, the United 
States is represented by a team of negotiators which is usually composed of representatives from the 
Export-Import Bank, the Trade Representative's Office, and the Departments of Commerce, State, 
and Treasury. Moore, supra note II, at 158. The United States negotiating position is coordinated by 
the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies (NAC). The NAC was 
created by the Bretton Woods Agreements Act of July 31, 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-171, 59 Stat. 512 
(1945). The NAC was abolished as a statutory entity by Exec. Reorg. Plan No.4 of 1965, 79 Stat. 1321, 
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 794 (1976) which transferred the functions of the NAC to the President. 
The NAC was reestablished by Exec. Order No. 11,269,3 C.F.R. 534 (1966-1970 comp.), reprinted in 22 
U.S.C. § 286b app. at 84 (1982), which empowered the Secretary of the Treasury, after consulting with 
the NAC, to direct representatives to international financial organizations. The composition of the 
NAC, set by Exec. Order No. !l,269, as amended by Exec. Order No. !l,808, 3 C.F.R. 902 (1971-1975 
comp.), Exec. Order No. 12,164,3 C.F.R. 444 (1980), and Exec. Order No. 12,188,3 C.F.R. 131 (1981), 
is as follows: Secretary of Treasury, chairman; Secretary of State; U.S. Trade Representative; Secretary 
of Commerce; Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; President of the 
Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of the United States; and the Director of the Interna-
tional Development Cooperation Agency. 22 U.S.C. § 286b app. at 84 (1982). 
126. Hufbauer interview, supra note 124. 
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Arrangement's limitations on maximum terms and minimum interest rates, 
Paragraph Nine requires the participant to notify all other participants at least 
ten days before issuing a commitment to supply the derogating export credit. 127 
At the end of this ten-day period, each participant has the right to make an 
export credit offer of its own to match that of the original derogating party.128 
While this may appear to constitute a loophole in the Arrangement limitations, 
the notification requirements have in effect served as the enforcement provi-
sions.129 By including the notification requirement, the signatories have encour-
aged respect for the Arrangement guidelines, since an attempt to gain an 
advantage with a purchaser by derogating from the limitations on terms and 
interest rates simply invites matching derogations from other countries before 
any contract is signed.130 Moreover, the communications carried out under 
Paragraph Nine, which can involve thousands of telex and telephone contacts a 
day between the export credit agencies,l31 have done much to reduce mutual 
suspicions.132 Such suspicions were further reduced on June 30,1982, when the 
Arrangement participants reached agreement on a set of amendments concern-
ing three areas of export credits that had been the source of sometimes bitter 
debate: derogations, the interest rate matrix, and mixed credits. 
3. The June 30, 1982 Amendments to the Arrangement 
a. Derogations 
The participants agreed that after October 15, 1982 they would not derogate 
from the maximum maturities and minimum interest rates specified in the 
Arrangement.133 Apparently, this agreement was a compromise through which 
the Europeans agreed to end their policy of derogations on interest rates if the 
United States would stop derogating on maturity lengths.134 In the past, when 
European export credit institutions had derogated from the Arrangement min-
imum interest rates, the United States Export-Import Bank had been at a 
disadvantage since, as a self-supporting institution,135 it had been unable to 
127. Arrangement, supra note 20, para. 9(a)(I). 
128. [d. para. 9(a)(2), 9(b)(2). 
129. Moore, supra note II, at 165; See Note, supra note 9, at 1085. 
130. Moore, supra note II, at 165; See Note, supra note 9, at 1085. 
131. Fry, supra note 58, at 75. 
132. See Moore, supra note II, at 156. 
133. Treasury News, Press Release of the Dept. of Treasury Ouly I, 1982) [hereinafter cited as 
Treasury News). See infra note 198 for the current maximum maturities and minimum interest rates set 
by the Arrangement. 
134. See European Report, July 3, 1982 (No. 877), Economic and Monetary Affairs, at 2. 
135. See 12 U.S.C. § 635d (1982) which authorizes the Bank to obtain funds by borrowing at the 
government bond rate. 12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(I)(B) (1982) mandates that the Bank lend its money after 
taking into consideration its borrowing costs. 
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match competitors' subsidized export credits. 136 In 1981, the Export-Import 
Bank adopted a new policy to meet foreign competition by derogating from the 
Arrangement with longer-term credits,I37 which are more attractive to borrowers 
since lengthening the term of a loan reduces the yearly payments.138 Other 
countries are unable to match American long-term loans because their domestic 
capital markets do not have the depth of the American market.139 As a result, 
other countries have difficulty borrowing even for fifteen years, whereas the 
United States government routinely borrows for twenty to thirty years.140 In 
agreeing not to derogate, the European Community and the United States have 
both given up their major weapon in the export credit war. 
While the no-derogation pledge seems to be a simple compromise, it has 
worked a fundamental change on the Arrangement. When derogations were 
allowed, the Arrangement was not in reality an agreement to limit interest rates 
and terms on government supported export credits. 141 Rather, it was a set of fair 
trading rules designed to cut down on export credit competition through its 
notification requirements. 142 The pledge to eliminate all derogations has trans-
formed the Arrangement into an agreement that fixes limits, not just proce-
dures. Just what limits should be set has been another area of heated discus-
sion.143 
b. The Interest Rate Matrix 
From the beginning the United States was dissatisfied with the Arrangement 
because the minimum interest rates allowed by the Arrangement were below 
commercial rates and thus constituted a subsidy.144 During the negotiation of the 
Arrangement, the United States delegation nearly walked out when it could get 
no agreement on higher minimum interest rates. 145 A deadlock was averted only 
when the Swedish delegation proposed a compromise whereby all parties agreed 
136. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 5; COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNtTED STATES, Report to the 
Congress; Financial and Other Constraints Prevent Eximbank From Consistently Offering Competitive Export 
Financingfor U.S. Exports, at i (April 30, 1980), reprinted in Hearing. supra note 4, at 68. 
137. N.Y. Times, November 21, 1980, at D8, col. 3. 
138. Competitive Export Financing Act of 1981, supra note 51, at 19 (testimony of Robert A. Cornell, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Trade and Investment Policy). 
139. To stay competitive, Ex-1m goes long term, Bus. WK., May 17, 1982, at 33. 
140. [d. 
141. See Arrangement, supra note 20, para. 9. 
142. Dodsworth, Export credits: a consensus in name only?, THE BANKER, May 1982, at 127. See supra 
notes 127-32 and accompanying text. 
143. See generally Hearing, supra note 4, at 1-208. 
144. See Moore, supra note II, at 147. Published tables of commercial interest rates are not available. 
However, the following interest rates prevailed on government bonds in February 1978: France, 9.55%; 
West Germany, 5.40%; Japan, 9.15%; the United Kingdom, 19.11%; and the United States, 7.67%. 
Theses figures are monthly averages of the rates on government bonds with medium to long terms. 35 
INT'L FIN. STATISTICS (june 1978) 27, 337, 381 (published monthly by the International Monetary Fund). 
These interest rates are lower than the interest rates on commercial loans. M. STIGUM, supra note 39, at 
25. 
145. Moore, supra note II, at 147. 
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that Mr. Axel Wallen, the head of the Export Credit Agency of Sweden, would 
review the question of minimum interest rates.146 
Mr. Wallen presented his report to the OECD on April 24, 1980.147 He 
proposed two alternatives to the interest rate matrix of the Arrangement. 148 The 
first of these was a differentiated rate system whereby a different minimum 
interest rate would be specified for each currency ofthe OECD countries.149 This 
proposal was aimed at correcting the basic inequality of the Arrangement, which 
sets the same minimum interest rates regardless of the currency in which the 
credit is denominated. 150 When one minimum interest rate applies to all curren-
cies, those countries with domestic interest rates higher than the minimum 
subsidize their credits if they offer credits at the minimum, while countries with 
domestic interest rates below the minimum are not able to subsidize their credits 
at all. 1s1 Mr. Wallen's differentiated system provided that the Arrangement 
minimum interest rate for each currency be equal to the market rate for 
medium-term government bonds in that currency.152 In this way the amount of 
subsidy relative to commercial market rates would be minimized and would tend 
to be equal among currencies. 153 Alternatively, the participants could agree to a 
certain amount of subsidy that would be defined as a function of the market 
government bond rate for each currency.154 
Wallen's second proposal called for a "uniform moving matrix," where one 
interest rate applicable to credits in all currencies would be determined by 
calculating a weighted average of the government bond rates of each currency.155 
The uniform moving matrix would not eliminate subsidized export credits since 
those countries with interest rates above the uniform rate would be able to 
146. [d. 
147. A. Wallen, supra note 4. 
148. See id. 
149. [d. at 7. 
150. H.R. RE;. No. 256, pt. I, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1981). 
151. !d. For example, suppose that in country A the interest rate for commercial loans of 5 to 8.5 
years is 16%, while the equiva1ent rate in country B is 7%. The Arrangement minimum at that time for 
credits of this term to rich countries was 8%. If country A offers credits at the 8% minimum, it would be 
subsidizing the transaction by paying one half of the normal financing costs. For country B the 
Arrangement minimum rate is in excess of normal commercial rates, so B cannot offer subsidized 
credits. 
152. A. Wallen, supra note 4, at 7. If this system had been implemented when Mr. Wallen presented 
his report, it would have resulted in minimum interest rates of 14.5% for the British pound, 12.875% 
for the French franc, 10.375% for the U.S. dollar, 9% for the Japanese yen and 8.25% for the German 
mark. [d. Annex 11, at 2. 
153. [d. at 7. 
154. !d. 
155. [d. at 17. The weight given to each currency would be equal to its proportion in the basket of 
currencies which make up the Special Drawing Rights of the International Monetary Fund. [d. The 
weighted average is calculated as follows; first, the weight of each currency is multiplied by the 
government bond rate of that currency; second, all of the products of weight and bond rate are added 
together; and third, the resulting sum is divided by the sum of all the weights. The final figure is the 
uniform rate for all currencies. 
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subsidize their export credits, while those countries with market rates below the 
uniform matrix would not.156 The uniform matrix would reduce subsidization, 
however, because it would express an average of market rates. Thus, it would 
avoid the possibility of all currencies having market rates above the Arrange-
ment minimum/57 in which case all countries would be able to subsidize their 
export credits.15s 
With both of these proposals, the report envisioned that the minimum rates 
would be adjusted every six or twelve months to account for changes in market 
rates.159 The Arrangement signatories would continue to offer credits to rela-
tively rich countries at rates higher than those offered to intermediate and 
relatively poor countries. 160 The rates for the latter two groups would be equal to 
95% and 90%, respectively, ofthe rates offered to the relatively rich countries.161 
The United States preferred the differentiated rate system since it embodied 
the most effective means to eliminate subsidized export credits.162 The differ-
entiated rate system received little serious negotiation, however, because some 
countries, most notably France, would not accept a system that would prohibit 
them from subsidizing the exports of certain industries.163 Countries with high 
inflation and interest rates, such as France and Italy, further argued that a 
differentiated rate system would put them at a disadvantage. 164 They based their 
arguments on the theory that purchasers are subject to "interest rate illusion," 
meaning that purchasers look only at the interest rate of a credit, preferring a 
Swiss franc rate of 4% over a British pound rate of 10%, even though the Swiss 
inflation rate might be 2% and the British rate 15%.165 There is no evidence to 
support the "interest rate illusion" proposition, however, which is contrary to 
sound economic reasoning.166 
The OECD did consider the uniform moving matrix seriously, but France also 
156. Id. at 17. 
157. See id. at 17. 
158. See supra note 48 and its definition of subsidized export credits. 
159. A. Wallen, supra note 4, at 7, 17. 
160. Id. at 19. 
161. /d. 
162. HOUSE REPORT,supra note 3, at 8; Hearing, supra note 4, at 136 (testimony ofe. Fred Bergsten, 
Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, Department of the Treasury) [hereinafter cited as 
Bergsten testimony). 
163. Hearing, supra note 4, at 137 (Bergsten testimony). As one French official explained it, "you have a 
clash of economic philosophies. We basically believe in government support for private business until 
these commercial enterprises prove that they don't need it, while the Americans believe in not interven-
ing until it is proven that a company needs help." Bassett, U.S. Pushing Europeans For Tighter Financing, 
AV1ATION WK. & SPACE TECH., March 10, 1980, at 26. 
164. Hearing, supra note 4, at 138 (Bergsten testimony). 
165. Id. at 138. 
166. Plaut, supra note 58, at 77. 
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rejected this proposal,167 Although it was supported by the European Commis-
sion and by the eight other members of the European Community,168 the 
unanimity rule of the European Community169 allowed France to veto any 
proposal to support the uniform moving matrix.170 Unable to gain reform of the 
Arrangement matrix, the United States worked to reduce export credit subsidies 
by raising the minimum interest rates specified in the Arrangement. l71 In May 
1980, the Arrangement Participants agreed to raise the minimum interest rates 
for relatively poor countries by .25% and the minimum interest rates for inter-
mediate and relatively rich countries by .75%.172 In October 1981 they agreed to 
raise all minimum interest rates by 2.5%, with the exception of the minimum 
interest rate on credits to relatively poor countries with terms over five years, 
which were raised by 2.25%.n3 This increase was adopted only after Japan was 
exempted from the Arrangement minimum rates and allowed a minimum rate 
of 9.25% on all credits.174 That the United States was at all successful in pushing 
through increases in the minimum rates was apparently due to the other sig-
natories' desire to reduce their subsidy costs, which had soared with the rise in 
interest rates.ns 
In June 1982, the Arrangement participants agreed to a new adjustment of 
the Arrangement matrix.176 Minimum interest rates were raised 1.15% for rela-
tively rich countries and .35% for intermediate countries.177 They also agreed to 
change the definition of the country c1assifications.178 Relatively poor countries 
are now defined as those eligible for financing through the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development.179 Relatively rich countries are those with 
a 1979 per capita GNP of $4000 or more.lSO All other countries are in the 
167. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 8; Moore, supra note 10, at 147-48. 
168. HOUSE REpORT, supra note 3, at 8; Moore, supra note 11, at 148. 
169. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done March 25, 1957, art. 138,298 
V.N.T.S. 11, 68. 
170. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 8; Moore, supra note 11, at 148. 
171. See Moore, supra note II, at 146-48. See supra note 108 for the original Arrangement minimum 
rates. 
172. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 8. 
173. Agreement on Export Credit Terms, OEeD OBSERVER, Nov. 14, 1981, at 14. 
174. See Arrangement, supra note 20, para. (3)(b). Japan insisted on this special minimum because its 
domestic lending interest rate was 8.5%. Requiring Japan to offer credits at the Arrangement minima of 
10-11.5% would have in effect been a penalty on Japanese exporters. Export credits: The Ikbits, THE 
ECONOMIST, Nov. 14, 1981, at 88. 
175. High Interest Rates Slow the Export Subsidy Race, Bus. WK., Aug. 31, 1981, at 62. France was 
spending as much as $2.5 billion on export credits subsidies in 1981. Id. 
176. Treasury News, supra note 133. 
177. Id. 
178. Exim News, Press Release of the Export-Import Bank of the Vnited States Uuly I, 1982) 
[hereinafter cited as Exim News). 
179. [d. 
180. Id. 
1984] EXPORT CREDITS 451 
intermediate class.181 For credits to those countries newly placed in the interme-
diate class, the new higher interest rates were phased in, and credits of up to ten 
years can still be offered to those countries.182 Japan continues to be exempted 
from the Arrangement matrix. Japan has agreed to charge 0.3% over the yen 
long-term prime rate when offering export credits. l83 Japan has also agreed to 
open its capital market so that foreign export credit agencies can offer yen 
financing. 184 
c. Mixed Credits 
Mixed credits is the term which describes the practice of offering export 
financing to a foreign purchaser that is composed in part of export credits at the 
Arrangement minimum rate, and in part of a foreign aid loan at an interest rate 
well below the Arrangement minimum, typically 3.5%.185 When the two loans are 
"mixed," or expressed as one credit, the resulting interest rate is below the 
Arrangement minimum.18s Mixed credits are a French innovation that have been 
strongly criticized by the other Arrangement participants, because they can be 
used to circumvent the minimum interest rates set by the Arrangement.187 
France has maintained that mixed credits are an important and necessary way of 
aiding less developed countries.188 The aid argument is weakened when one 
considers that mixed credits have been granted to countries such as Brazil, 
Israel, and Mexico, which can afford export financing without resorting to 
181. [d. Bahrain, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Israel, and the Soviet Union were moved into the 
relatively rich category. Brazil, Chile, .Hong Kong, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, South Korea, 
and Taiwan were moved into the intermediate category. Europe, July 3, 1982 (No. 3404) at 9. 
182. Exim News, supra note 171. As of June 30,1982, the Arrangement matrix of minimum interest 
rates and maximum terms was as follows: 
Number of years in maximum 
repayment terms 
Classification of country 2 to 5 5 to 8.5 8.5-10 
Relatively rich 12.15% 12.4% No Credits 
Intermediate 10.85% 11.35% No Credits 
Countries newly placed 
in the intermediate class 
effective immediately 10.5% 10.75% 10.75% 
effective 1/1/83 10.85% 11.35% 11.35% 
Relatively poor 10% 10% 10% 
[d. 
183. Treasury News, supra note 133. 
184. [d. 
185. Moore, supra note II, at 149. 
186. [d. 
187. [d. 
188. [d.; see Hearing, supra note 4, at 152 (Bergsten testimony). 
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foreign aid.189 In the opinion of a U.S. trade official, the aid argument is really a 
"cynical excuse" for greater subsidization of export credits. 190 
Efforts to eliminate mixed credits have not been successful, and several coun-
tries, including Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Scan-
dinavian countries, have begun to use mixed credits in order to match the 
French offers.191 On June 30, 1982, the Arrangement Participants agreed to 
limit the use of mixed credits by prohibiting mixed credits that have a grant 
element of less than 20%.192 U.S. negotiators consider this change only a first 
step, and have continued to press for a prohibition of mixed credits with a grant 
element of less than 50% in order to create a clear division between those credits 
granted as aid and those granted as normal credits. 193 
4. The October 15, 1983 Amendments to the Arrangement 
In the fall of 1983 the Arrangement Participants agreed to new interest rate 
guidelines similar to the uniform moving matrix proposed by Mr. Wallen in 
April 1980.194 The guidelines, which became effective on October 15, 1983, 
created a base interest rate to be determined by calculating the weighted average 
of the yields on long-term (approximately ten years) U.S., German, French, 
Japanese, and British government bonds on the secondary market.195 The base 
rate is then used to calculate the interest rate matrix. The minimum rate for 
credits to relatively rich countries for two to five years is determined by adding 
205 basis points (2.05%) to the base rate. Credits for 5 to 8.5 years to those same 
countries is calculated by adding 230 basis points (2.30%) to the base rate. For 
intermediate countries, the minimum interest for credits of two to five years is 
determined by adding 75 basis points (.75%) to the base rate, while the minimum 
interest rate for credits of 5 to 8.5 years is determined by adding 125 basis points 
189. Moore, supra note II, at 149; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 7. 
190. Hearing, supra note 4, at 152 (Bergsten testimony). 
191. Moore, supra note II, at 149. 
192. Treasury News, supra note 133. The OECD calculates the grant element as follows: the present 
value at the market rate of interest of each repayment is ascertained. assuming a market interest rate of 
10%; the sum of these present values is then subtracted from the face value of the credit; the resulting 
figure is then stated as a percentage of the face value, giving the grant element of the credit. R. POATS. 
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION, OECD EFFORTS AND POLICIES OF THE MEMBERS OF THE DEVELOPMENT 
ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE: 1983 REVIEW 171 (1984) (report by the chairman of the OECD Development 
Assistance Committee) 171. 
193. Telephone interview with Eileen Roulier (May 31, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Roulier inter-
view]. Ms. Roulier is an economist in the Office of Trade Finance at the U.S. Treasury Department. 
Given the recent increases in the minimum interest rates allowable on export credits. mixed credits are 
the only avenue through which Arrangement Participants can grant credits containing substantial 
subsidies. Consequently, mixed credits are receiving the most attention in the current negotiations at 
the OECD. [d. 
194. Treasury News, Press Release of the Department of the Treasury (Oct. 17, 1983) [hereinafter 
cited as Treasury News, October 1983]. 
195. [d. 
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(1.25%) to the base rate. The minimum rates for credits of any maturity up to 
ten years to relatively poor countries are equal to the base rate minus ten basis 
points (.10%).196 The base rate and all the minimum rates calculated from it will 
be adjusted each January 15 and July 15 to reflect changes of one half of a 
percent or more in the average base rate of the preceding month, as compared to 
the average monthly base rate of the previous six-month period.197 The Ar-
rangement Participants also agreed to temporarily lower rates to intermediate 
and relatively poor countries.198 
Those currencies with domestic commercial rates below or nearly below the 
Arrangement matrix rates will have one minimum interest rate under the Ar-
rangement.l99 This rate is equal to the commercial interest reference rate (CIRR) 
of that currency, which is defined as a margin over the monthly average borrow-
ing costs of five-year fixed interest rate funds.2°O The CIRRs are updated each 
month to reflect the average interest tate of the previous month.201 
196. Roulier interview, supra note 193. 
197. Treasury News, October 1983, supra note 194. The current base rate is 10.1%, but is likely to 
increase in July 1984. Roulier interview, supra note 193. 
198. Treasury News, October 1983, supra note 194. The Arrangement matrix of minimum interest 
rates and maximum terms now is as follows: 
Classification of country 2-5 
years 
12.15% 
Number of years in maximum 
repayment terms 
5-8.5 
years 
12.40% 
10.35% (10.85%) 10.70% (11.35%) 
8.5-10 
years 
No credits 
No credits 
Relatively rich 
Intermediate 
Relatively poor 9.50% (10.00%) 9.50% (10.00%) 9.50% (10.00%) 
The numbers in parentheses are the rates that were in effect from July 6,1982, to October 15,1983, 
thus showing the amount of the temporary reduction in minimum interest rates offerable to those 
countries. The Arrangement Participants plan to increase these temporarily reduced rates in order to 
bring them back up to the rates that prevailed before October 15, 1983. Rates for credits of two to five 
years to intermediate countries and rates on all credits to relatively poor countries will be increased by 
twenty-five basis points on July 15, 1985. and again by twenty-five basis points on January 15, 1986. 
Minimum interest rates for credits of over five years to intermediate countries will be raised by thirty 
basis points on July 15, 1985, twenty-five basis points on January 15, 1986, and by ten basis points on 
July 15, 1986. These increases are in addition to any increases in the rates due to an increase in the base 
rate. If the base rate decreases. these scheduled increases are set off against the decrease. [d. Note that 
countries placed in the intermediate category in July 1982 may still be offered credits with terms up to 
ten years long at the same interest rate as for credits in the 5 to 8.5 year range. See id. and supra note 182 
and accompanying text. 
199. Treasury News, October 1983, supra note 194. 
200. [d. 
201. [d. CIRRs now serve for the minimum rate for three currencies, the Japanese yen, the German 
Mark, and the Swiss franc, which had CIRRs of 8.30%, 9.65%, and 7.05%, respectively, in November 
1983. Current CIRRs are available on request from the U.S. Treasury Department. [d. 
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S. Conclusion 
Though the Arrangement is not legally binding on its participants,202 it has 
moderated the competition in export credits.203 The Arrangement was 
strengthened by the amendments of June 30, 1982,204 which raised the minimum 
interest rates, ended the use of derogations and limited the offer of mixed 
credits.205 The guidelines adopted in October, 1983 greatly reduced the subsidi-
zation of export credits.206 Even so, the Arrangement minimum rates of 9.S to 
12.4% are below the commercial market interest rates of many countries.207 If 
these countries offer export credits at the Arrangement minimum rates, their 
exporters will have an advantage over the producers of other countries whose 
customers must borrow at commercial rates.208 The important issue then arises as 
to whether the Subsidies Code allows governments to use countervailing duties 
against imports that are financed by export credits that comply with the provi-
sions of the Arrangement, but are below commercial interest rates. The U.S. 
trade officials who negotiated the Subsidies Code have maintained that the 
countervailing of such imports would be consistent with the United States' 
international obligations.209 
IV. REMEDIES AGAINST SUBSIDIZED EXPORT CREDITS: THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE 
ARRANGEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND U.S. LAW 
A. The Subsidies Code 
The Subsidies Code210 provides two "tracks" of remedies that a signatory may 
use when it is adversly affected by the subsidy of another signatory.2l1 The first 
track is the use of countervailing duties.212 If a signatory of the Subsidies Code 
finds that one of its imports is subsidized by an exporting signatory, and that 
202. See supra notes 119-126 and accompanying text. 
203. Moore, supra note Il,at 156; A U.S. plan to give exp01'Urs more clout, Bus. WK., Sept. 25, 1978, at 
62. 
204. See Treasury News, supra note 133; Exim News, supra note 171. 
205. See Treasury News, supra note 133; Exim News, supra note 171. 
206. See supra notes 195-201 and accompanying text. 
207. For example, in March 1984, the following countries had government bonds with interest rates 
higher than the Arrangement minima: Belgium, 12.40%; Canada, 13.06%; France, 12.87% (Feb. 1984); 
Italy, 15.88% (Feb. 1984); and the United States, 12.45%. 37 INT'L FIN. STATISTICS (May 1984) 61 
(published monthly by the IMF). As noted earlier, government bond rates are several percentage points 
below commerical rates. See supra note 39. 
208. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. 
209. Greenwald interview, supra note 31. 
210. Subsidies Code, supra note 16. 
211. A. STOLER, SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY MEASURES: UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNA-
TIONAL AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY MEASURES AND RELATED PROVISIONS OF 
THE UNITED STATES TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT OF 1979, at 1 (U.S. Department of Commerce 1979). 
212. [d. at 11. 
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subsidy is causing an injury to the importing signatory, it may impose a counter-
vailing duty upon the subsidized import.213 
The second track of remedies involves the Subsidies Code's dispute resolution 
process.214 A signatory may request consultations with another signatory 
whenever it believes an export subsidy is being granted by the other signatory,215 
or whenever the subsidy of another signatory injures its domestic industry, 
impairs its benefits accruing under GATT, or seriously prejudices its interests.216 
If consultations do not lead to a mutually acceptable solution, a signatory may 
refer the dispute to the Committee of Signatories for conciliation.217 During the 
conciliation process, the Committee reviews the facts of the dispute and encour-
ages the signatories to develop a mutually acceptable solution.218 If the matter 
remains unresolved, a signatory may request that the Committee establish a 
panel219 which reviews the facts of the dispute and presents its findings to the 
Committee as to the rights and obligations of the signatories.220 The Committee 
considers the panel's report and makes recommendations to the parties with a 
view to resolving the dispute.221 If the Committee's recommendations are not 
followed, the Committee may authorize appropriate countermeasures, including 
withdrawal of GATT concessions or obligations.222 
The Subsidies Code distinguishes between export subsidies, which are prohib-
ited,223 and domestic subsidies, which are allowed.224 This distinction has no 
effect on the use of the countervailing duty remedy, which a signatory can 
impose against any subsidy as long as injury is shown.225 The distinction between 
export subsidies and domestic subsidies is important, however, with respect to 
the use of the dispute resolution process. That process can be initiated against 
prohibited export subsidies when there is no evidence of injury,226 whereas the 
process can be initiated against domestic subsidies only if the complaining party 
has been injured by the subsidy.227 
213. Subsidies Code, supra note 16, art. IV, para. 4. The Subsidies Code defines injury as material 
injury or threat of material injury to a domestic industry or material retardation of the establishment of 
such an industry. [d. art. II, para. 2 n.1. 
214. A. STOLER, supra note 211, at I I. 
215. Subsidies Code, supra note 16, art. XII, para. I. 
216. [d. art. XII, para. 3. 
217. [d. art. XIII, para. I and 2. The Committee of Signatories is composed of representatives from 
each of the signatories to the Subsidies Code. /d. art. XVI, para. I. 
218. [d. art. XVII, para. I. 
219. [d. art. XVII, para. 3. 
220. [d. art. XVIII, para. I. 
221. [d. art. XVIII, para. 9. 
222. [d. 
223. [d. art. IX, para. I. 
224. [d. art. VIII, para. I, art. XI, para. I. 
225. Se. id. art. IV, para. 4. The countervailing duty provisions of art. IV require the finding of a 
subsidy, without distinguishing between domestic subsidies and export subsidies. 
226. [d. art. XII, para. I. 
227. [d. art. XII, para. 3. 
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A dispute currently exists between the European Community and the United 
States as to whether the countervailing remedy of the Subsidies Code can be used 
against subsidized export credits that comply with the Arrangement.228 This 
dispute centers on the meaning of the second paragraph of item k of Annex A to 
the Code.229 It is clear that the first paragraph of item k prohibits subsidized 
export credits, and that the second paragraph creates some sort of exception for 
subsidized export credits that are granted in compliance with the Arrange-
menL230 In the American view, the second paragraph simply converts subsidized 
export credits from a prohibited subsidy to a non-prohibited subsidy with the 
same status as domestic subsidies.231 According to this view, subsidized export 
credits in conformity with the Arrangement are still considered a countervailable 
subsidy.232 
On other hand, the European Community insists that the second paragraph 
was specificaly added to item k to exempt export credits within the Arrangement 
from countervailing duty action.233 The second paragraph states that "an export 
credit practice which is in conformity with [the Arrangement] shall not be 
considered an export subsidy prohibited by this Agreement."234 Therefore, in 
the opinion of the European Community, if subsidized export credits in confor-
mity with the Arrangement are not prohibited, they cannot be export subsidies 
since all export subsidies are prohibited by Article IX.235 If they are not export 
subsidies they cannot be subsidies at all since it would be absurd to claim that 
subsidized export credits within the Arrangement are some form of domestic 
subsidy.236 
Support for the European Community's position can be found in statements 
made by U.S. officials. On July 14, 1978, Gary C. Hufbauer, a negotiator of the 
Arrangement, told a House subcommittee that violation of the Arrangement 
"might well serve to trigger a countervailing duty investigation."237 By this 
statement, Mr. Hufbauer implied that subsidized export credits within the Ar-
rangement are not countervailable.238 Further, in a legal analysis of the Subsidies 
Code dated July 15, 1979, the International Trade Commission239 stated that 
228. Greenwald interview, supra note 31; Hufbauer interview, supra note 124. 
229. Greenwald interview, supra note 31; Hutbauer interview, supra note 124. See supra the text 
accompanying note 90 for the text of item k. 
230. See Subsidies Code, supra note 16, Annex A, item k. 
231. Greenwald interview, supra note 31. 
232. Id. As noted supra in note 225 and in the accompanying text, all subsidies are countervailable 
under the Subsidies Code. 
233. Brief of the European Communities, supra note 30, at 1-3. 
234. Subsidies Code, supra note 16, Annex A, item k. 
235. Brief of the European Communities, supra note 30, at 2. 
236. Id. 
237. American and Foreign Practices in the Financing of Large Commercial Aircraft Sales Earnings Before the 
Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d.Sess. 77 (1978). 
238. See id. 
239. The International Trade Commission is a United States agency that has the duty to investigate 
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"export credits at rates below those necessary to obtain private funds [are] export 
subsid[ies] unless the signatory is party to a separate undertaking on official 
export credits."24o One year later, U.S. Trade Representative Reuben Askew told 
a Senate committee that "there is a legal exception in the Subsidies Code ... but 
the fact of the matter is [that export credit subsidies are] as much a government 
subsidy as anything else that you can think of, and it's clearly against the whole 
spirit and thrust of the [Multilateral Trade Negotiations] and subsidies code even 
though specifically provided for."241 The latter two statements indicate that, for 
purposes of the Code, subsidized export credits were not defined as subsidies.242 
It follows then that if they are not subsidies, they are not countervailable.243 
If the United States and the European Community cannot reach an agreement 
on this issue, they can request the Committee of Signatories of the Subsidies 
Code to resolve the issue under the dispute resolution procedures of Article 
XVIII of the Code.244 Resolution of this dispute will be difficult because item k 
was not a heavily negotiated issue, so there is little record of the signatories' 
intentions at the time.245 According to the chief U.S. negotiator of the Annex to 
the Subsidies Code, the European Community's interpretation of the Subsidies 
Code is not without merit, although he believes that the language of the Code 
does not preclude a countervailing action against subsidized export credits that 
are in conformity with the Arrangement.246 However this dispute is resolved, the 
solution may not have any legal effect on United States countervailing duty law. 
B. United States Countervailing Duty Law 
Under U.S. law, a countervailing duty investigation is initiated whenever the 
International Trade Authority (IT A)247 determines that an investigation is war-
ranted, or whenever a United States manufacturer, wholesaler, union, or trade 
association248 petitions the ITA to commence an investigation.249 If the ITA finds 
the administrative, industrial, and fiscal effects of the customs laws of the United States. The ITC also 
has the power to investigate the volume and effects of imports into the United States. 19 U.S.C. § 1332 
(1982). Included in these powers to investigate is the determination of injury in countervailing duty 
cases. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2) (1982). 
240. U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, INVESTIGATION No. 332-101, ANALYSIS OF NONTARIFF 
AGREEMENTS: SUBSIDIES/COUNTERVAILING DUTY MEASURES AGREEMENT 81 (1979), reprinted in SENATE 
COMM. ON FINANCE, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6(1) MTN STUDIES 183, (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter 
cited as ITC INVESTIGATION). 
241. Hearing, supra note 4, at 128 (testimony of Reuben Askew, U.S. Trade Representative). 
242. See ITC INVESTIGATION, supra note 240, at 81; see also Hearing, supra note 4, at 128 (testimony of 
Reuben Askew, U.S. Trade Representative). 
243. See Subsidies Code, supra note 16, art. IV. 
244. See supra notes 214-22 and accompanying text. 
245. Hufbauer interview, supra note 124. 
246. Id. 
247. For a description of the ITA, see supra note 26. 
248. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(b)(I), 1677(9)(C)-(E) (1982) for a definition of those parties that can 
petition for a countervailing duty investigation. 
249. 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(a) and (b) (1982). 
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that an import has been subsidized and if the International Trade Commission 
(ITC) finds that the subsidized import is materially injuring a domestic industry, 
threatening a domestic industry with material injury, or retarding the establish-
ment of a domestic industry, a countervailing duty must be imposed equal to the 
amount of the subsidy.250 Prior to the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,251 the 
statute required only a finding of a subsidy for the imposition of a countervailing 
duty.252 The injury test was added to U.S. law to bring it into conformity with the 
Subsidies Code.253 In signing the Subsidies Code each country agreed to take all 
necessary steps to conform their laws, regulations, and administrative proce-
dures with the provisions of the Code.254 
1. The Statutory Definition of Subsidy 
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 also amended U.S. countervailing law by 
adding a definition of subsidy.255 Subsidy is defined in the statute as having "the 
same meaning as the term 'bounty or grant' as that term is used in § 1303 of this 
title."256 Section 1303 does not contain a definition of "bounty or grant,"257 but 
the legislative history of the Trade Agreements Act makes it clear that Congress 
intended that, under U.S. law, subsidy retain "the meaning which practice and 
the courts have ascribed to the term 'bounty or grant' under [Section 1303]."258 
In its consideration over the years of countervailing duty cases under Section 
1303, the Treasury259 never decided whether subsidized export credits are coun-
250. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1982). 
251. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 
Trade Agreements Act]. 
252. See Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590, at 687 (1931). 
253. H.R. REp. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1979); S. Rep. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 
(1979)rtprintedin 1979 U.S. CODECONG. & AD. NEWS 381, 430. The determination of injury is required 
only in those countervailing duty investigations that involve imports from a signatory of the Subsidies 
Code, from a non-signatory who substantially complies with the Code, or from GATT non-members 
with whom the United States has entered into agreements, the provisions of which require an injury 
determination before a countervailing duty can be imposed. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1671(b) (1982). 
254. Subsidies Code, supra note 16, art. XIX, para. 5(a). The injury test of 19 U.S.C. § 167I(a) (1982'), 
however, does not conform exactly to that of the Subsidies Code. The Code requires a showing that the 
subsidized imports, "through the effects of the subsidy," are causing injury. [d. art. VI, para. 4. 19 
U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1982) requires only a showing that the subsidized imports are causing injury. There 
are, therefore, circumstances where injury could be found under U.S. law but not under the Code - for 
example, when an import receiving a small subsidy is injuring a U.S. industry, not because of the 
subsidy, but because it is a higher quality product. 
255. Trade Agreements Act, supra note 251, § 771,93 Stat. 177-78 codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) 
(1982». 
256. [d. 
257. See 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982). 
258. H.R. REp. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1979), quoted in Note, supra note 9, at 1081. 
259. Before the passage of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the Treasury considered countervail-
ing during investigations. See Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, § 303, 46 Stat. 590, 687 (1931). 
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tervailable.260 Thus, the ITA has not been able to rely on precedent in deciding 
whether subsidized export credits are a subsidy within the meaning of the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979.261 
The statutory definition of subsidy also "includes, but is not limited to ... any 
export subsidy described in Annex A to the [Subsidies Code]"262 Thus, incorpo-
rated by reference in the statute's definition of countervailable subsidy is the 
definition of subsidized export credits in the first paragraph of item k.263 It is not 
clear, however, if the exception in the second paragraph of item k is also 
incorporated by reference. On the one hand it has been argued that the second 
paragraph is not incorporated by reference since it does not describe an export 
subsidy, but merely an exception to the list of prohibited export subsidies.264 On 
the other hand, it is arguable that the statute incorporates the whole annex to the 
Code given that the whole annex, including the second paragraph of item k, was 
reprinted in the Congressional Record during the Senate debate of the Trade 
Agreements Act.265 Even if the IT A finds that the second paragraph is a part of 
U.S. law, however, the ITA must then decide if the second paragraph exempts 
from countervailing duty action those export credits in conformity with the 
Arrangement.266 
260. Feller, Mutiny Against the Bounty: An Examination of Subsidies, BorMr Tax Adjustments, and the 
Resurgence of the Countervailing Duty Law, I LAW & POL'y INT'L Bus. 17,46 (1969). 
261. See Ceramic Tile, supra note 27; Railcars Final Determination. supra note 27. 
262. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A) (1982). 
263. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
264. Note, supra note 9, at 1081. 
265. 125 CONGo REc. 20,166-67 (1979). 
266. See supra notes 228-46 and accompanying text. At this point, it may be argued that the IT A 
need not consider the incorporation question because the Subsidies Code has the force of domestic law 
in the United States. Section !OI of the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified at 
19 U.S.C. § 2111 (1982», gave the President the authority to negotiate trade agreements with foreign 
countries during the five-year period beginning January 3, 1975.1d. at 1982. Pursuant to this power, the 
President negotiated the Subsidies Code and the other agreements of the Tokyo Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations. These agreements are not treaties, but executive agreements. Cohen, The Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979: Executive Agreements, Subsidies, and Countervailing Duties, 15 TEXAS INT. L.J. 96, 97 
(1980). An executive agreement is an international agreement signed by the President or his representa-
tive and not submitted to the Senate for ratification. Id. at 98. Self-executing executive agreements have 
the force of domestic law and supersede previously enacted statutes. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 142, 143 (1965). An executive agreement is 
self-executing if it creates rights and obligations enforceable in courts of the United States without the 
aid of any legislative provision. See Cohen, supra, at 100. See also Foster V. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 
314 (1829). The Subsidies Code is not self-executing, A. STOLER, supra note 211, at 12, given its 
language requiring each signatory to conform its laws, regulations, and administrative precedures with 
the Subsidies Code. See Subsidies Code, supra note 16, art. XIX, para. 5. Further evidence that the 
Subsidies Code is not self-executing can be seen in the Trade Act of 1974 which stipulated that trade 
agreements negotiated under that Act would have no domestic or international effect on the United 
States without implementing legislation. Trade Act of 1974, supra, § 102 88 Stat. 1982-84 (1974) 
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2112(e) (1982). See S. REp. No. 1208, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1974). 
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2. Administrative Interpretations of Subsidy in Export Credit Cases 
a. The Mexican Ceramic Tiles Case 
Two recent countervailing duty cases before the IT A have involved the use of 
export credits and the issue posed by item k. On October 30, 1981, the ITA 
initiated a countervailing duty investigation of Mexican ceramic tile after receiv-
ing a petition from the Tile Council of America, Inc. 267 The petition alleged that 
the government of Mexico was providing its domestic producers and exporters 
of ceramic tile with three types of benefits that were countervailable under U.S. 
law: tax credits on exports; tax credits on regional investment; and preferential 
export financing. 268 Since Mexico is not a signatory to the Subsidies Code, there 
was no requirement of a finding of injury before a countervailing duty could be 
imposed.269 
In its final determination of the case, the IT A found that all three of the 
Mexican government programs under investigation were bounties or grants 
within the meaning of Section 1303 and imposed a countervailing duty of 
15.84% on imports of Mexican ceramic tiles from manufacturers which be-
nefitted from the programs.270 In its consideration of the export credits issue, the 
IT A found that Mexico had conferred benefits on its ceramic tile exporters 
through the Fund for the Promotion of Exports of Mexican Manufactured 
Products (FOMEX).27I Under this program, the Bank of Mexico administers the 
financing of FOMEX loans through financial institutions.272 The financial institu-
tions in turn establish lines of credit with manufacturers and exporters of 
ceramic tile, through which they provide export financing in the currency of the 
importing country at 6% interest.273 The IT A calculated the subsidy element of 
these credits by computing the interest expense of the FOMEX credits and the 
As a nonself-executing agreement, the Subsidies Code can have a domestic law effect in the United 
States only if implementing legislation is passed. Note, The Domestic Legal Effect of Declarations That Treaty 
Provisions Are Not Self-Executing, 57 TEXAS L. REv. 233, 234 (1980). Congress implemented the Subsidies 
Code by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 which approved the Subsidies Code and the other 
Agreements of the Tokyo Round. Trade Agreements Act,supra note 243, § 2,93 STAT. 147, (codified at 
19 U.S.C. § 2503 (1982)}. The Act provided, however, that if any provision of an approved agreement 
conflicted with a statute of the United States, the statute would prevail. [d. § 3, 93 STAT. 148, (codified at 
19 U.S.C. § 2504 (1982)}. Congress included this provision in the Act to make dear that the Multilateral 
Trade Negotiation Agreements have no domestic legal effect in the United States except to the extent 
that Congress expressly implemented them. Cohen, supra, at 105, Thus, if the Subsidies Code exempts 
from countervailing duty action those export credits in conformity with the Arrangement, the same is 
true for U.S. law only if Acts of Congress can be interpreted to that effect. See id. 
267. Ceramic Tile From Mexico; Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation, 46 Fed. Reg. 
53,738,53,738 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Initiation of Ceramic Tile]. 
268. [d. 
269. [d. 
270. Ceramic Tile, supra note 27, at 20,012-14. 
271. [d. at 20,014. 
272. [d. 
273. Id. 
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interest expense of similar loans at the then commercially available rate of 
23.49%.274 The IT A then allocated the difference in interest expense over the 
value of the tile imports to the United States.275 
The government of Mexico contested the finding of an export credit subsidy, 
arguing that the FOMEX loans are comparable to loans authorized by the 
Arrangement, that loans within the Arrangement are not countervailable by 
virtue of item k of Annex A to the Subsidies Code, and that therefore FOMEX 
loans are not countervailable.276 The IT A refused to address these arguments, 
stating that Mexico is not a party to the Arrangement and that in any case, 
FOMEX loans have terms and rates different from those set by the Arrange-
ment.277 
b. The Railcars From Canada Case 
The problem posed by item k was again at issue in the Railcars From Canada 
case.278 This case grew out of the efforts of the New York Metropolitan Transit 
Authority (MT A) to finance its capital improvement program.279 In November 
1981, the MTA issued an invitation to bid on 825 railcars, specifically requesting 
that the bids be supported by financing.280 Three companies - Budd, the sole 
remaining American producer of railcars; Bombardier, of Montreal; and Fran-
corail, a French consortium - made bids.281 The Francorail and Bombardier 
bids both included government supported export credits at 9.7% to be repaid in 
seventeen semi-annual installments.282 Budd's bid also included government 
supported export credits provided by the governments of Brazil and Portugal, 
but since these credits were limited to components manufactured in those coun-
tries, the proportion of the bid covered by financing was much less than the 85% 
of the other two bids.283 To compensate for this deficiency, Budd petitioned for 
financing from the Export-Import Bank,284 but this effort was unsuccessful.285 
274. Id. at 20,014-15. 
275. Id. at 20,015. 
276. Id. at 20,014. 
277. Id. 
278. See Railcars Final Determination, supra note 27. 
279. See Tracking credit on the subway, Bus. WK., Dec. 14, 1981, at 131 for a discussion of the financing 
alternatives pursued by the MT A. 
280. Railcars Final Determination, supra note 27, at 6571. 
281. /d. 
282. /d. 
283. Post-hearing brief of the Budd Company at 20, Railcars Final Determination, 48 Fed. Reg. 6569 
(1983). 
284. Under 12 U.S.C. § 635a-3 (1982), the Secretary of the Treasury can authorize the Export-
Import Bank to provide credit to U.S. bidders on a U.S. contract if the Secretary finds that foreign 
bidders on the contract are benefiting from export credits that exceed the limits set by international 
arrangements, and if the Secretary finds this non-competitive financing is likely to be a determining 
factor in the awarding of the contract. 
285. Post-hearing brief of the Budd Company at 20-21, Railcars Final Determination, 48 Fed. Reg. 
6569 (1983). 
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OnJune 10, the MTA contracted with Bombardier for the 825 railcars, subject 
to the conclusion of a satisfactory financing agreement with the Export Devel-
opment Corporation (EDC), a Canadian Crown Corporation owned by the 
Canadian government.286 On November 15, 1982, the EDC agreed to finance 
85% of the Bombardier/MTA contract up to $750 million at 9.7% interest per 
year.287 The decisive factor in the rejection of Budd's bid, which included a lower 
price and an earlier delivery date than Bombardier's,288 was the lack of competi-
tive financing. 289 Bombardier won out over Francorail because it promised that 
40% of the contract would be spent on U.S. components and assembly, with as 
much as half of that to be spent in New York state.290 
On June 24, 1982, Budd submitted a countervailing duty petition to the IT A 
alleging that Bombardier had benefitted from countervailable subsidies, spec-
ifically, preferential export financing and regional development grants in its 
contract with the MT A.291 The petition further alleged that subsidized imports 
of Canadian railcars were materially injuring, or threatening to materially injure, 
a U.S. industry.292 On July 14, 1982, the Industrial Union Department of the 
AFL-CIO, the United Automobile and Aerospace Workers, and the United 
Steelworkers of America, as representatives for union members in the Budd 
Company and its suppliers, requested to become co-petitioners with the Budd 
complaint.293 The ITA initiated its investigation on July 20, 1982.294 
On February 4, 1983, the ITA made its final determination that Bombardier 
had benefitted from subsidies in the amount of $91,216,125 in its contract with 
the MT A.295 The portion of this amount due to subsidized export credit, 
$90,882,000, was broken down into three sub-parts. First, the ITA concluded 
that the EDC financing at 9.7%, in the place of the MT A borrowing on the 
tax-exempt bond market, had a value of $65,229,000.296 Second, the ITA con-
sidered the "option value" of the financing agreement under which the MT A is 
286. Railcars Final Determination, supra note 27, at 6571. 
287. /d. 
288. Petition Filed with the United States Trade Representative Under Section 301 of the Trade Act 
of 1974 as Amended, reprinted in Office of the United States Trade Representative, [Docket No. 301-32] 
47 Fed. Reg. 31,764, 31,765 (1982). 
289. See 1TC Preliminary Determination; Rail Passenger Cars From Canada; Determination, 47 Fed. 
Reg. 36,0434, 36,043-44 (1982). 
290. A subway collision over export credits, Bus. WK., June 14, 1982, at 31. 
291. Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation; Railcars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. 31,415, 
31,416 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Railcars Initiation]. 
292. /d. at 31,415. Since Canada is a signatory of the Subsidies Code, a countervailing duty can be 
imposd against a Canadian product only upon a finding of subsidy by the ITA and a finding of injury by 
the ITC. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (1982). 
293. Railcars Initiation, supra note 291, at 31,415. 
294. Id. 
295. Railcar Final Determination, supra note 27, at 6569 ($91,216,125 equals 825 cars multiplied by 
the $110,565 per car net subsidy estimated by the ITA). 
296. Id. at 6572. 
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to use the available EDC financing as Bombardier delivers the railcars.297 The 
MT A can choose not to use the EDC financing, however, if other cheaper credit 
becomes available.29B The ITA found this flexibility to be worth $16,237,000.299 
Third, the IT A concluded that the expense of providing the option would have 
been borne by Bombardier in a transaction free of government involvement.3OO 
Therefore, the ITA calculated the interest expense Bombardier would have 
realized if it had borrowed an amount equal to the option price.30I The IT A 
computed this interest expense to be $12,219,000.302 
A threshold consideration in the Railcars case was whether the EDC financing 
at 9.7% constituted a countervailable subsidy. The MT A argued that the EDC 
financing was an effort to match the prior commitment of France to support 
Francorail's bid with 9.7% financing.303 The MT A argued that because such 
matching is provided for in the Arrangement,304 the EDC financing was in 
compliance with the Arrangement.30S The MT A argued further that financing in 
compliance with the Arrangement is non-countervailable due to the second 
paragraph of item k of Annex A to the Subsidies Code.306 However, the ITA 
dispensed with this argument by pointing out that item k only exempts those 
export credits "in conformity with [the interest rate] provisions" of the Ar-
rangement.307 Derogations and matching derogations are specifically identified 
by the Arrangement as "not in conformity" with the Arrangement,308 so that the 
item k exemption did not apply in this case.309 In a related matter, the MT A 
argued that export credits in conformity with the Arrangement should not be 
considered a subsidy and that therefore the calculation of the subsidy ofthe EDC 
financing should be made with reference to the minimum rate allowed by the 
Arrangement, rather than with reference to market interest rates.3IO The ITA 
dismissed this argument as well, again holding that since the EDC financing was 
in derogation of the Arrangement, item k did not apply.3ll 
297. !d. at 6571, 6572. 
298. [d. 
299. [d. From this figure the ITA subtracted the extra administrative expenses the MTA incurred by 
arranging financing through the EDG rather than through the financial markets. [d. at 6573. 
300. See id. 
301. [d. 
302. [d. 
303. [d. at 65'79. 
304. See Arrangement, supra note 20, para. 9. See also supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text. 
305. Railcars Final Determination, supra note 27, at 6579. 
306. See id. 
307. [d. 
308. Arrangement, supra note 20, para. 9(a)( I). 
309. See id. 
310. Railcars Final Determination, supra note 27, at 6578. 
311. [d. at 6579. 
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V. FUTURE TREATMENT OF SUBSIDIZED EXPORT CREDITS UNDER U.S. 
COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAW 
The Ceramic Tile and Railcars cases established several important precedents. 
Taken together, they established that supplier's credits and buyer's credits re-
ceive identical treatment under U.S. countervailing duty law.312 In Ceramic Tile, 
the Mexican government had used a supplier's credit program, FOMEX, to 
provide export credit to exporters and manufacturers of ceramic tile.313 The 
International Trade Authority (IT A) measured the benefit the FOMEX loans 
conferred by comparing the interest rates the ceramic tile exporters and man-
ufacturers paid to FOMEX and the interest rate they would have paid on the 
commercial market.3l4 The Railcars case involved a buyer's credit transaction 
where the EDC provided credit directly to the U.S. buyer, the MTA.315 The 
MT A argued that since the EDC financing benefitted the MT A, the subsidy 
should be calculated with reference to the MT A's, and not Bombardier's, normal 
borrowing costS.316 This issue is important where the seller and buyer have 
different credit ratings, and was especially important in this case where the MT A 
could have raised money on the tax-exempt bond market.317 The IT A ruled, 
however, that Bombardier's commercial borrowing interest rate was the applica-
ble benchmark for calculating the countervailable benefit since this rate reflected 
the rate that would have prevailed on equivalent financing arranged by Bom-
bardier absent the EDC's intervention.318 Thus, these two cases have established 
that whether a countervailing duty case involves buyer'S credits or supplier's 
credits, the subsidy will by calculated with reference to the borrowing costs of the 
exporter or manufacturer. 
The Ceramic Tile case set the precedent that the United States will impose 
countervailing duties when governments that are not signatories to the Subsidies 
Code offer credits at interest rates below commercial rates to finance exports to 
the United States.3l9 These countervailing duties will be imposed without any 
determination of injury.32o 
The Railcars case established that when governments that are signatories to the 
312. For the definitions of supplier's credits and buyer's credits, see supra note 1. 
313. Ceramic Tile, supra note 27, at 20,014. 
314. Id. at 20,014-15. 
315. Ste Railcars Final Determination, supra note 27, at 6571. 
316. Id. at 6577. 
317. Tracking credit on the subway, supra note 279, at 131. 
318. Railcars Final Determination, supra note 27, at 6574, 6578. In spite of this decision, the MT A's 
borrowing costs were relevant in the calculation of subsidy. This was due to the terms of the financing 
agreement under which the EDe agreed to buy MTA bonds that would pay 9.7% interest. The ITA 
compared this interest rate to the market rate for MTA bond, since in a hypothetical commercial 
financing arrangement free of government intervention, Bombardier would have been willing to buy 
MTA bonds at market rates because they could resell them at that rate.ld. 
319. See Ceramic Tile, supra note 27. 
320. Initiation of Ceramic Tile, supra note 276, at 53,731. 
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Subsidies Code offer export credits to finance exports to the United States at 
interest rates below Arrangement rates, the United States will impose counter-
vailing duties if the ITC finds the subsidized imports are causing injury.321 
The Railcars case also established that in cases involving export credits at rates 
below Arrangement rates, the ITA will use commercial interest rates as the 
benchmark for calculating the countervailable subsidy.322 The MT A had argued 
that the minimum interest rates set by the Arrangement were the appropriate 
benchmark since, in their opinion, export credits at rates above the minimum are 
not a countervailable subsidy.323 The ITA dismissed this argument, holding that 
since the EDC financing was in derogation of the Arrangement, the second 
paragraph of item k did not apply.324 The IT A, however, was too quick to reject 
the MT A's argument. Whether the EDC financing was in conformity with the 
Arrangement was relevant only in considering if the financing was a subsidy 
within the meaning of item k.325 The IT A correctly pointed out that even if 
export credits within the Arrangement are not considered a subsidy, the EDC 
financing is not exempted from countervailing duty action since it did not fit the 
item k definition of export credit "in conformity with" the Arrangement.326 Once 
the ITA established that the EDC financing was a subsidy, the issue then became 
what interest rate would serve as the benchmark from which the subsidy would 
be calculated.327 The MT A argued that the minimum interest rates allowable by 
the Arrangement should be the benchmark since, in the MT A's opinion, credit 
at rates above the Arrangement minima are not considered a subsidy.328 Instead, 
the ITA applied the interest rate that would have prevailed in a financing 
agreement between Bombardier and the MT A free of Canadian government 
involvement.329 
This decision could lead to anomalous results in future cases.330 If the ITA 
later rules that item k does exempt export credits within the Arrangement from 
countervailing duty action, then an export credit at, for example, 12.5% would 
321. See Railcars Final Determination, supra note 27. 
322. /d. at 6574, 6578-79. 
323. Id. at 6578. 
324. /d. at 6578-79. 
325. Compare the Subsidies Code, supra note 16, Annex A, item k, with the Arrangement, supra note 
20, para. 9. 
326. Railcar Final Determination, supra note 27, at 6579. 
327. Id. at 6571-72. 
328. Id. at 6578-79. 
329. Id. at 6572. 
330. The benchmark issue will not be further litigated in the Railcars case because Budd withdrew its 
complaint on February 9, 1983, saying that it had established the principle that fairness in the market 
should not be prejudiced by subsidized credit. N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1983, at BI, col. 8. The following 
day, the unions which had joined the Budd complaint also withdrew from the case after the MTA 
agreed to abide by federal "Buy America" standards in future railcar purchases through 1985. N.Y. 
Times, Feb. II, 1983, at B I, col. I. The "Buy America" provisions require 51 % of the components of a 
product to be produced in the United States. Id. at B2, col. 7. 
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not be a subsidy, while an export credit at 12% would.331 According to the 
Railcars decision, the subsidy of the 12% export credit would be calculated with 
reference to a commercial rate benchmark, however, and not with reference to 
the Arrangement minima that serve as the benchmark that exempts the credits 
at 12.5%.332 Thus, the Railcars case would lead to two benchmarks in future 
cases. Since a benchmark rate establishes the division between subsidized and 
non-subsidized credits, two benchmarks would mean there are two definitions of 
subsidy, a result not sanctioned by the statute.333 To avoid this possibility, the ITA 
should have considered the item k issue, deciding whether export credits within 
the Arrangement are exempt from countervailing duties. If such export credits 
are found to be non-countervailable, the Arrangement minima, rather than 
commercial rates, should serve as the benchmark in all export credit cases 
involving Subsidies Code signatories. 
In these cases, the IT A left unanswered the question of whether the Subsidies 
Code has any effect on the United States definition of subsidy. The ITA has 
several options for resolving this issue if it is raised in a future case. First, the 
IT A could rule that the second paragraph of item k was not incorporated into 
U.S. law by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 and thus has no effect on the U.S. 
definition of subsidy.334 Any export credits below commercial rates would then 
be countervailabie under the Ceramic Tile rule that, absent an effect by the 
Subsidies Code on United States law, all export credits below commercial rates 
are a subsidy.335 Although this stand on incorporation would not be unwar-
rant.ed, given the uncertainty as to what Congress intended to incorporate,336 
such a decision might be interpreted to be a rejection of the Subsidies Code. 
Since the United States agreed to conform its la~s to the Subsidies Code when it 
became a signatory, it may damage trade relations if the IT A were to rule that 
U.S. countervailing duty law is unaffected by the Subsidies Code. 
If the ITA does find that the second paragraph of item k is a part of U.S. law, 
it must then decide what the second paragraph means. Here again, the IT A will 
be faced with two options, the U.S. and European Community interpretations, 
both of which can be supported by good arguments given the ambiguities of the 
Subsidies Code.337 The IT A should reject the European Community interpreta-
tion of the second paragraph, however, because it is contrary to the general 
purposes of the Subsidies Code, which are to prohibit export subsidies and to 
331. The current Arrangement minimum interest rates for credits to the United States are 12.15% 
for credits of two to five years and 12.40% for credits of five to 8.5 years. Treasury News, supra note 133. 
332. See Railcars Final Determination, supra note 27, 6578-79. 
in the text accompanying notes 228-243. 
333. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1982). 
334. See supra notes 262-265 and accompanying text. 
335. Ceramic Tile, supra note 27, at 20,014. 
336. See supra notes 262-265 and accompanying text. 
337. These interpretations are discussed supra in the text accompanying notes 228-243. 
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provide uniform rules for the countervailing of all subsidies.338 Subsidized ex-
port credits are export subsidies prohibited by the Subsidies Code, except that 
export credits in conformity with the Arrangement are not prohibited.339 Taking 
into consideration the argument of the European Community,340 it is unclear 
why an export subsidy that is not prohibited is considered no subsidy at all. 
Indeed, if the European Community interpretation were accepted, subsidized 
export credits in conformity with the Arrangement would be the only non-
countervailable subsidy recognized by the Subsidies Code. It is more logical to 
accept the interpretation put forward by the U.S. negotiators of the Subsidies 
Code, who argue that non-prohibited subsidized export credits should be treated 
like non-prohibited domestic subsidies, which are countervailable.341 The IT A 
should adopt this interpretation of item k when the issue is appropriately raised 
in a future case. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Industrialized countries began to support export credits in the post-war years 
as a way to promote their capital goods exports. When the oil crisis of the 1970's 
intensified the competition for export markets, the industrialized countries rap-
idly increased their use of subsidized export credits as a way to increase exports. 
Like all subsidies, export credit subsidies are a form of unfair competition that 
cause trade distortions and economic inefficiencies. Countries have long used 
countervailing duties to negate the unfair advantage of subsidized imports, but 
the usefulness of countervailing duties is limited to the domestic market where 
they are imposed, so that they cannot be used to eliminate unfair competition in 
international markets. 
GATT contains rules to limit the use of subsidies in international markets, but 
these have proven largely ineffective. Consequently, the OECD nations com-
menced discussions to limit the competition in export credits. The discussions 
culminated in the Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export 
Credits (Arrangement), which set minimum interest rates and maximum terms 
for export credits. The Arrangement has not eliminated subsidized export 
credits and negotiations at the OECD have often been contentious, but the 
Arrangement has done much to limit the use of subsidized export credits. Recent 
changes in the Arrangement have succeeded in further restricting the use of 
subsidized export credits. 
A year after the entry into force of the Arrangement, a sub-group of GATT 
signatories reached agreement on the Subsidies Code, which contains detailed 
rules on the use of subsidies and countervailing duties. All exports subsidies, 
338. See Subsidies Code, supra note 16. 
339. [d. art. IX, Annex A, item k. 
340. See supra notes 235-236 and accompanying text. 
341. See supra note 231-232 and accompanying text. 
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including export credit subsidies, are prohibited. Item k of the annex to the 
Subsidies Code provides that export credit subsidies are not prohibited, how-
ever, if they are in conformity with the Arrangement. This exception is sig-
nificant because many export credits that comply with the Arrangement are 
subsidized and are therefore potentially subject to countervailing duties. The 
European Community has argued that if subsidized export credits in conformity 
with the Arrangement are not prohibited, they are not a countervailable subsidy, 
because all export subsidies are prohibited. The United States has maintained 
that such credits are countervailable, arguing that non-prohibited subsidized 
export credits should be treated like non-prohibited domestic subsidies which 
are countervailable. 
Two countervailing duty cases in the United States have dealt with this issue. 
In the Ceramic Tile case, the ITA established that export credits offered by 
Subsidies Code non-signatories at below commercial rates are countervailable. In 
the Railcars case, the ITA found that export credits offered by Subsidies Code 
signatories at below Arrangement rates are countervailable. In both cases the 
IT A stated that it need not decide whether subsidized export credits in confor-
mity with the Arrangement are countervailable since that issue was not applica-
ble to the facts. 
Resolution of this issue in a future case will turn on two considerations. The 
IT A must first decide whether the second paragraph of item k was incorporated 
into U.S. law by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. The legislative intent on this 
question is ambiguous, so that the IT A has discretion to rule either way. This 
Comment has argued that the IT A should find for incorporation since to do 
otherwise would indicate to our trading partners a U.S. belief that it need not 
conform its laws to the Subsidies Code, in spite of a specific provision to that 
effect in the Code. If the ITA does find all of item k incorporated into U.S. law, it 
must then interpret item k. This Comment has concluded that the European 
Community interpretation, which would define subsidized export credits in 
conformity with the Arrangement as a unique form of non-countervailable 
subsidy, is contrary to the purpose of the Subsidies Code, which is meant to 
control subsidies, especially export subsidies. The U.S. interpretation of item k, 
which would give identical treatment to subsidized export credits in conformity 
with the Arrangement and domestic subsidies, is the more logical approach. 
Mark D. Fernald 
